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TEORI PERMAINAN DALAM INDUSTRI 
PENERBANGAN DAN PELABUHAN 
 
ABSTRAK 
Kajian ini memberi tumpuan kepada aplikasi-aplikasi model teori permainan dalam 
industri pengangkutan dan logistik yang melibatkan 3-pemain, dalam konteks 
bekerjasama dan persaingan. Khususnya, model teori permainan yang berkenaan 
telah digunakan dalam analisis senario bagi industry penerbangan di China dan 
industry pelabuhan di Malaysia dan Singapura. Industri penerbangan negara China 
telah menghadapi pelbagai cabaran sejak dari tahun 1979, akibat daripada aktiviti-
aktiviti penyahkawalseliaan dan pembaharuan ekonomi, yang memulakan 
transformasi industri dari sistem perancangan pusat (kerajaan) kepada sistem 
kapitalis (swasta). Cabaran utama yang dihadapi oleh industri ini telah ditunjukkan 
dari segi pelonggaran syarat kemasukan syarikat baru ke dalam industri, lonjakan 
syarikat penerbangan yang baru dan syarikat penerbangan asing secara tiba-tiba, 
serta pesaingan harga yang sengit telah mengakibatkan kerugian serius bagi industri 
ini pada tahun 1998. Langkah pembaharuan industri telah diambil. Pada tahun 2002, 
usaha penggabungan industri telah mewujudkan tiga buah syarikat penerbangan 
dominan: Air China Limited (AC), China Southern Airlines (CS) dan China Eastern 
Airlines (CE). Selain daripada penggabungan mandate oleh Civil Aviation 
Administration of China (CAAC), bilangan kes pengambilalihan yang berjaya bagi 
CS dan CE adalah sama, manakala AC mempunyai 8 kes pengambilalihan yang 
berjaya dalam tempoh usaha penggabungan dan pengambilalihan. Dengan 
menggunakan model persaingan Cournot 3-pemain yang bermaklumat sempurna, 
 x 
keputusan CAAC dari segi kecekapan strategik telah dikaji berdasarkan perbelanjaan 
operasi, pendapatan penumpang dan keuntungan. Ketiga-tiga syarikat penerbangan 
menunjukkan prestasi yang lebih baik selepas pengambilalihan. Bahagian kedua tesis 
ini pula menunjukkan analisis terhadap permintaan trafik laut pelabuhan pindahkapal 
di Malaysia dan Singapura yang terletak di laluan Timur Jauh-Eropah: Port of 
Singapore (PSA), Port Klang (PKL) dan Port of Tanjung Pelepas (PTP). Thesis ini 
menyediakan analisis senario melalui model teori permainan 3-bentuk interaksi. 
Keputusan kajian menunjukkan bahawa pakatan strategik antara PSA dan PTP 
menjana keuntungan yang lebih lumayan kapada rangkaian hub-and-spoke semasa, 
sementara PKL tidak perlu terlibat dalam mana-mana strategi kerjasama sama ada 
dengan PSA atau dengan PTP. 
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GAME THEORY IN AVIATION AND PORT INDUSTRY 
 
ABSTRACT 
This research focuses on the applications of 3-player cooperative and non-
cooperative game theoretic models in the transportation and logistics industry. In 
particular, respective game theory models have been applied in the scenario analyses 
of the China’s aviation sector and the port industries of Malaysia and Singapore. 
China’s civil aviation industry has witnessed many challenges since its deregulation 
and economic reforms in 1979, which saw the beginning of a transformation from a 
fully state-owned machinery to a rent-seeking private sector. The major challenges of 
the deregulation are a lax market entry, sudden surge in new and foreign carriers, and 
intense price wars that resulted in major losses for the industry in 1998. A reform 
was sought. In 2002, mergers and consolidation efforts led to three dominant 
carriers: Air China Limited (AC), China Southern Airlines (CS), and China Eastern 
Airlines (CE). CS and CE completed about the same number of acquisitions, while 
AC has 8 completed acquisitions within the consolidation period other than the 
mergers mandated by the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC). Using a 
3-player non-cooperative perfect information Cournot game, the strategic efficiency 
of the CAAC’s decisions to consolidate the industry based on operating expense, 
passenger revenue, and profitability are investigated. All three airlines are better off 
with acquisition. The second section of this thesis analyses the ocean freight traffic 
demand for the Far East-Europe route among three main transshipment ports located 
in Malaysia and Singapore: Port of Singapore (PSA), Port Klang (PKL), and Port of 
 xii 
Tanjung Pelepas (PTP). This thesis provides a scenario analysis to the 3-way 
interaction through a game theoretic model. The results suggest that a strategic 
alliance between PSA and PTP generates greater profitability to the current hub-and-
spoke network, while PKL should not commit to any cooperative strategy with either 
PSA or PTP. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
This research focuses on the application of 3-player cooperative and non-cooperative 
game theoretic models in the transportation and logistics industry. In particular, two 
different game theory models have been applied respectively in the scenario analyses 
of China’s aviation sector and the port industries of Malaysia and Singapore. This 
section will begin with some background introduction of China’s aviation industry, 
which is then followed by the port industries of Malaysia and Singapore ports. 
1.1.1 Background of China’s Aviation Industry 
Previous research have analysed the Chinese aviation industry based on its major 
economic and political reforms between the period 1970 and 2002 (Dougan, 2002). 
The evidence shows that after four stages of reform (marketization, destatization, 
decentralization, and globalization), the aviation industry had turned from a strictly 
regulated industry into a partially deregulated one. The state’s authority over the 
aviation industry had been reduced, owing to non-state factors, such as market 
sentiments, pressure from local government groups, and travel needs brought about 
by foreign enterprises. 
China’s airlines were once considered to be one of the world’s most unsafe airlines 
(Dougan, 2002). Due to the economic reformation process, the aviation industry 
expanded rapidly, where new entrants formed a large number of airlines. The 
reformations prior to the 2002 consolidation have led the industry into a situation 
where many new airlines, which are not under the direct control of the Civil Aviation 
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Administration of China (CAAC), have entered the industry. As a regulator of the 
industry, the CAAC was not able to monitor the safe operations of all airlines and 
other operational standards. In addition, with the intense price war brought about by 
the increased competition from the new market entrants, China’s aviation industry 
suffered a combined loss of more than RMB 3 billion in 1998 (Dougan, 2002). The 
loss was due to the discounted airfares sold at an unsustainable level, even when 
passenger loads were high. While passenger growth in civil aviation was steady 
before 2002, after 2002, the industry experienced an exponential growth (Figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1 Passengers carried for China’s aviation industry, 1980-2012 (Source: The 
World Bank, 2013) 
Although the CAAC no longer retains full control, it could still enforce policy 
changes on the industry. The CAAC is more than a regulator and safety authority; it 
decides on the routes that local and foreign airlines can fly and on the development 
of the industry. Since 2002, the CAAC had mandated that nine airlines be reduced 
into three major state-owned airline companies, under a major Chinese aviation 
consolidation exercise (Figure 1.2) (Dougan, 2002; Shaw et al., 2009). The 
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 3 
consolidation provides CAAC with a means to regain control over the industry, as 
well as improve the industry’s overall profitability. The three major groups were 
reformed under the Civil Aviation System Reform Program, and were given a chance 
to buy or lease more aircraft. The Big Three comprising Air China (AC), China 
Southern (CS), and China Eastern (CE) is a consolidation effort to manage pricing 
and to better plan the concentration of routed in the network (Zhang & Round, 2011). 
Even though their operating costs may be relatively lower than the other regional 
airlines, they are all saddled with inefficiencies from the consolidation process, 
primarily AC with China Southwest Airlines; CS with China Northern Airlines; CE 
with Yunnan Airlines. 
 
Figure 1.2 Nine smaller regional carriers forming the Big Three – China National 
Aviation Holdings, China Southern Holdings, and China Eastern Air Holdings 
Since joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2002 (Agarwal & Wu, 2004), 
the industry has been facing more intense competition. The mergers that took place 
are expected to increase industry competitiveness in a sustainable fashion, and not 
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through further price wars. This also suggests a market correction effort by the 
Chinese government to ease the outcome observed from its earlier liberalization, 
which saw major losses in the industry due to an initial intense direct competition. 
Competition outside of these three major carriers is considered to be negligible, as 
AC, CS, and CE hold 28.9 percent, 26.6 percent, and 23.6 percent market share, 
respectively in terms of revenue-passenger kilometres (Chiu, 2013). This situation 
provides an ideal representation of an oligopolistic market. 
Price deregulation took place after the three merged groups became more 
established, which allowed airlines to freely decide on airfares and this ended the 
government-controlled fare system. Therefore, the airline sector in China is an 
oligopolistic market structure. Through deregulation, CAAC allowed new entrants to 
the industry, including Hainan Airlines, which later became the fourth largest airline 
in China. We exclude the study of Hainan Airlines as follows. First, Hainan Airline 
is predominantly point-to-point flight operation while the other airlines use a hub-
and-spoke flight operation. Second, Hainan Airlines is an independent airline, not 
owned and controlled by the state (Peng, 2010). 
1.1.2 Background of Malaysia and Singapore Ports’ Industry 
The introduction of containerization method in the mid-1950s resulted in an efficient 
method of transferring goods. Containerization intensified the competitive port 
industry, where larger ports try to maintain their status as the industry leaders. 
Market expansion due to liberalization over the years and the opening of 
manufacturing locations in labour competitive countries has moved logistics 
operations globally. This paved the way for an increase in cross border networks and 
led to the growth of global container traffic. Table 1.1 shows the world’s top 20 
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major container ports and their respective container traffic from 2002 to 2012. The 
development of container terminals in the Asia Pacific region has been more 
dynamic compared to the other regions elsewhere, as eight of the top 10 major world 
ports are located in this region. The ports of Shanghai and Singapore are the two 
leading container ports globally, handling 32,529 million TEUs and 31,649 million 
TEUs in 2012 respectively. 
The globalization process fuelled by increasing international trade has led to the 
rapid development of the maritime transport industry. Shipping lines deploy ever-
larger vessels to achieve better scale economies by reducing the unit cost per TEU. 
Table 1.2 shows different generations of container vessels introduced, with their 
respective maximum capacity. Maersk Line, the world’s largest shipping company, 
has placed orders with Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co. 
Ltd. to construct 20 units of Triple-E vessels (Editorial, 2013). The Triple-E vessel is 
the world’s largest and most efficient container vessel. The new vessel got its name 
from the three E’s, which stand for “Economies of scale”, “Energy efficiency”, and 
“Environmentally improved”. Ten vessels will be delivered to Maersk Line from 
2013 to 2014, with the rest scheduled for delivery in 2014 and 2015. The 
introduction of the E-class vessel by Maersk is expected to meet the increasing 
demand as well as to maintain its position as the world’s largest shipping line. 
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Table 1.1 Top 20 major container ports globally 
Rank 
(2012) 
Rank 
(2002) Port, Country 
Container 
throughput, 
(‘000 TEUs) 
Growth 
rate, (%) 
2012 2002 2012/2002 
1 4 Shanghai, China 32,529 8,620 277.37 
2 2 Singapore, Singapore 31,649 16,941 86.82 
3 1 Hong Kong, China 23,097 19,144 20.65 
4 6 Shenzhen, China 22,941 7,614 201.30 
5 3 Busan, South Korea 17,030 9,436 80.48 
6 33 Ningbo-Zhoushan, China 16,830 1,860 804.84 
7 28 Guangzhou Harbour, China 14,743 2,180 576.28 
8 16 Qingdao, China 14,500 3,410 325.22 
9 13 Dubai, United Arab Emirates 13,280 4,194 216.64 
10 25 Tianjin, China 12,300 2,410 410.37 
11 7 Rotterdam, Netherlands 11,866 6,515 82.13 
12 11 Port Klang, Malaysia 10,000 4,533 120.60 
13 5 Kaohsiung, Taiwan, China 9,781 8,493 15.17 
14 9 Hamburg, Germany 8,864 5,374 64.94 
15 10 Antwerp, Belgium 8,635 4,777 80.76 
16 8 Los Angeles, U.S. 8,078 6,106 32.30 
17 26 Dalian, China 8,064 1,367 489.90 
18 22 Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia 7,700 2,660 189.47 
19 36 Xiamen, China 7,202 1,750 311.54 
20 21 Tanjung Priok, Indonesia 6,200 2,800 121.43 
Source: American Association of Port Authorities 
Table 1.2 Various container vessel generations and their respective capacity 
Vessel 
generation Year Vessel type 
Max. 
length 
(meters) 
Max. 
draft 
(meters) 
Max. 
capacity 
(TEUs) 
First 1956 Early Containerships 200 9.0 500-800 
Second 1970 Fully Cellular 215 10.0 1,000-2,500 
Third 1980 Panamax 250 12.5 3,000-3,400 
Fourth 1985 Panamax Max 290 12.5 3,400-4,500 
Fifth 1988 Post Panamax 285 13.0 4,000-5,000 
Sixth 2000 Post Panamax Plus 300 14.5 6,000-8,000 
Seventh 2004 New Panamax 366 15.2 12,500 
Eighth 2006 Post New Panamax 397 15.5 15,000 
Ninth 2013 Triple-E 400 15.5 18,000 
Source: The Geography of Transport Systems, 3rd Edition (Rodrigue, 2013) 
However, there still exist drawbacks in deploying the larger container vessels. Given 
the draft limits of container ports, fewer ports are able to serve the vessels directly 
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without infrastructure improvement (Lee et al., 2008) . The subject of optimal ship 
size has been investigated by, among others, Cullinane and Khanna (2000), with 
sensitivity analysis showed that shipping lines actually enjoyed economies of scale at 
the optimal vessel size of about 8,000 TEUs. Although medium-sized vessels are the 
most cost effective, larger vessels enable carriers to cope with market demand 
fluctuations (Gelareh et al., 2013). Container ports have to project future demand 
into building better port equipment and infrastructure such as larger cranes and larger 
warehouse space in order to serve even larger vessels in the future. 
1.2 Research Scope and Objectives 
In the context of China’s aviation industry, though the merger was initiated by the 
CAAC, inter-airline competition still exists, which affects the profitability among the 
airlines. This thesis considers a 3-player Cournot game to assess the competition 
among China’s three airlines – Air China Limited (AC), China Southern (CS), and 
China Eastern (CE). Specifically, we investigate the differences in the pre-and-post 
merger initiative of 2002, particularly on the effects of M&As on airline profitability 
and to justify if the decision made by the CAAC has positive or negative externalities 
on the industry and the three airlines. 
Moreover, the second part of this thesis’s analysis focuses on the interaction of three 
ports from Malaysia and Singapore that are homogeneous in terms of location and 
their role in serving the Far East-Europe trading route. The main objective of the 
ports’ study is to explore both cooperative and non-cooperative (competitive) 
opportunities that lie among the three major transshipment container ports located in 
the proximate region. The three ports are the Port of Singapore (PSA), Port Klang 
(PKL), and Port of Tanjung Pelepas (PTP). Cooperation motivation among PSA, 
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PKL, and PTP remains unexplored in the literature. The main contribution of this 
research is to bring out this issue among the players specified. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that competing head on among the ports may not be a sustainable strategy, 
especially when, ceteris paribus, cost is the main motivator for carriers to switch 
ports. Therefore, we investigate the possible port alliances, and whether this would 
generate economies of scope for the overall industry as well as contribute to the 
economies of scale for the individual ports. 
Note that it is not our intension to develops a new theory in the transportation 
industry, or solving network problems in the aviation and port industries. The 
objective of this research is to apply cooperative and non-cooperative game theoretic 
models in analysing both cooperative and competitive strategies among aviation 
(China’s Big Three) and port (Singapore and Malaysia) industries. To our 
knowledge, no study has been conducted with respect to the application of game 
theoretic model in these industries, particularly in their geographical areas. 
Therefore, our intention is to cover the research gap as stated above. 3-player game 
theory models have been applied to the study of two different transportation 
industries: aviation (China) and port (Malaysia and Singapore) industry. Under the 
scenario analysis of the Chinese aviation industry, we try to analyse whether the 
major consolidation effort that took place in the year of 2002 serve its purpose well 
in improving the profitability of the industry. Besides that, it is also our intention to 
find out whether there exist any cooperative opportunity that lies among the three 
respective ports (PSA, PKL and PTP) analysed in this study. 
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1.3 Organization of Thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview on the historical 
timeline of game theory development. This chapter also includes discussion of 
various game theoretic models. 
Chapter 3 provides the relevant literature on several subjects, which are related to our 
studies. The literature begins with the discussion of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) cases in the aviation industry, follows by the general applications of game 
theoretic models in analysing industry cases that involve M&As and strategic 
alliances. Cooperative and non-cooperative approaches that have been applied in the 
previous studies, which are related to the port industry has been summarized in the 
end of this chapter. 
Chapter 4 provides the industry review on China’s aviation industry transformation 
and development. It is then followed by the methodology and introduction of the 
necessary Cournot game model. The methodological section provides detailed 
notation definitions and various scenarios correspond to the Cournot game theoretic 
model that has been applied in China’s aviation industry. This chapter ends with the 
presentation of the results based on the eight different scenarios developed under the 
Cournot game models. 
The second part of this research, which focuses on the port industry in Malaysia and 
Singapore, has been presented in Chapter 5. This chapter provides some industry 
context of the three ports involved in the analysis, which follows by the methodology 
and the presentation of the mathematical formalization of the game theory model 
with its relevant assumptions. The findings have been discussed to make complete to 
this chapter. 
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Chapter 6 concludes the study with a discussion on managerial implications and 
suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2  
AN OVERVIEW ON GAME THEORY 
2.1 Introduction to Game Theory 
Game Theory is a study of applied mathematics, a branch under the field of 
Operations Research, which is concerned with how rational individuals make 
decisions when they are mutually independent. Game theory models involve 
mathematical modelling of strategic behaviour with the combination of ideas and 
theorems to provide a rational basis for resolving conflicts, both with and without 
cooperation. The fact that individuals are bound to be in conflict with important 
decisions illustrates the importance of game theory. It provides a framework for 
analysing situations in a more rational perspective and to formulate alternative 
choices depending on various circumstances. 
2.2 Brief History of Game Theory 
Dimand and Dimand (1996) provides a detailed literature on the development of 
game theory. Their discussion covers the work before the analytical work, ‘Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior’ written by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).  
In this chapter, we will be giving only a brief discussion on the several important 
milestones in game theory. 
The initial concept of game theory is derived from probability theory. Game theory 
began with the idea written in the letter by James Waldegrave to Pierre Rémond de 
Montmort in November 13, 1713. Waldegrave provided the first known mixed 
strategy solution of a matrix game for a card game, le Her. The principle of minimax 
strategy has been introduced to solve the game. Therefore, the mixed strategy game, 
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which is based on the concept of probability, is considered as one of the important 
initiative of game theory. However, the minimax theorem had not been further 
applied to other areas (Dimand & Dimand, 1996). 
Game theory deals with mathematical modelling of conflict and cooperation. Formal 
mathematical analysis of conflict emerged from World War I in the writings of 
‘Aircraft in Warfare’ by Lanchester (1916) and ‘Mathematical Psychology of War’ 
by Richardson (1935). Lanchester’s work examined how to win battles by choice of 
appropriate strategy such as concentration of forces, while Richardson attempted to 
understand the dynamics of arms races and the statistics of outbreak of wars as aids 
to prevent war. He analysed conflict in order to produce peace. 
In the year 1928, John Von Neumann managed to provide the general proof of the 
existence of minimax solution concept (Von Neumann, 1928). The concept of 
minimax was then used to solve strategic form games. Von Neumann also provided a 
comprehensive and formal concept on game theory. Game theory started to gain 
prominence when the ‘Theory of Games and Economic Behavior’ written by Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) was published. This publication is usually 
credited as the origin of the formal study of game theory. Most of the earlier works 
were working on specific problem rather than on constructing a mode of thought, 
which had little influence until the published work of ‘Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior’.  
However, the concept of equilibrium used in game theory is attributed to Cournot 
(1838) to duopoly models. In 1950, John Forbes Nash Jr. introduced and proved the 
concept of (Nash) equilibrium in his PhD. thesis named ‘Non-Cooperative Games’ 
(Nash Jr., 1950). Nash introduced the concept of (Nash) bargaining solution for 
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coalitional games in 1951. The Nash equilibrium concept introduced is generalized 
for both non-cooperative and cooperative games. Each player’s strategy is optimal in 
the Nash equilibrium. Regardless of what other players’ choice of strategy, no 
players will have the incentive to deviate from the optimal strategy in the Nash 
equilibrium. 
Lloyd Shapley, who was Nash’s peer at Princeton University, introduced the 
concepts of Shapley value and the core, which are solution concepts for cooperative 
games, conceived by Edgeworth (1881). The concept of Shapley value was 
introduced to determine the power of the members of the United Nations Security 
Council. The paper published by Shapley and Shubik (1954) represents one of the 
earliest explicit applications of game theory to political sciences. 
Game theory became accessible to a wider audience with the publication of the 
‘Games and Decisions’ by Luce and Raiffa (1957). Throughout the years, game 
theory has been applied to a wide range of behavioural analysis studies, mainly in 
warfare, economics, political science, psychology, evolutionary biology, real world 
business decision, transportation industry, and many more. In order for researchers 
who lack the mathematical background to further understand and apply the concept 
of game theory, there exist some references such as  ‘Game Theory and Political 
Theory: An Introduction’ (Ordeshook, 1986), ‘Decision Making using Game Theory: 
An Introduction for Managers’ (Kelly, 2003) and many other references that focus 
more on the basic ideas and formulation of game theory, without putting too much 
emphasis on the theorems such as the ones in ‘Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior’. 
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2.3 Elements of A Game 
Game theory models are high-level abstraction of real-life situations. These models 
consist of three basic elements; they are the players, strategies, and payoffs. By 
player, we refer to any two (or more) interdependent variables, including individuals, 
companies, countries, or even animals, which makes rational decisions (at least 
conceivable to us humans) in the game. The strategies refer to the available options 
or choices for each individual in the game. Finally, the payoffs denote the outcomes 
(rewards or penalty) received by each individual in the end of the game depending 
upon what other individuals’ choices. Note that each player’s payoffs may 
correspond to monetary reward, such as profits, revenue, etc., or the utility 
(satisfaction) of each player in the end of the game. 
Any situation that involves decision makers with a certain set of decision choice can 
be illustrated as a game, and analysed by using game theory. Players’ strategies, 
objectives, and their potential payoffs will be analysed systematically in a game. 
Therefore, game theory replicates models of rational decision-making situations in 
reality. However, real world scenarios are often more complex. The application of 
game theory resembles an extreme simplification model of real world situations 
(economics, business, biology, crime, war, etc.) with some defined assumptions. 
Such simplification is to make the resulting models more tractable. From the 
definition itself, we know that game theory is a study of how rational players make 
their decisions when they are mutually independent. Therefore, the two assumptions 
that are to be made in order to apply game theory are rationality and mutual 
independence. 
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Individuals are said to be rational when they seek to maximize their welfare, vice 
versa. Individuals who make their decision with respect to their own self-interest are 
assumed to be rational. Due to the complexity that lies among the decision-makers, 
this assumption may seem to be unrealistic, since in reality, individuals are not 
always rational while making decisions. However, the assumption of rationality is 
necessary to narrow down the range of possibilities, while obtaining the long-run 
equilibrium of the game, which works best for the players. 
In the context of the assumption of mutual independence, the welfare of any player is 
assumed to be at least partially determined by the actions of other players in the 
game. Each player’s decision will directly affect their own payoffs, while affecting 
others’ payoffs. In the context of non-cooperative games, none of the player can be 
better off without making someone else worse off. However, in games involving 
incentives among the players to cooperate, all players could be better off at the same 
time. 
2.4 Game Theoretic Models 
This section will provide the general taxonomy of game theory concepts. The 
division of game theoretic models are based on several dimensions, which we will 
discuss them in the following subsections. 
2.4.1 Non-Cooperative vs. Cooperative Games 
The available strategies of the players are the ones that determine whether the game 
is a non-cooperative game, or a cooperative game. A game is cooperative when there 
exist possible joint actions among the players. On the other hand, it is impossible for 
the players to form binding commitments in a non-cooperative game. A non-
cooperative game has also been denoted as a competitive game. 
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2.4.2 Strategic Form vs. Extensive Games 
A strategic form game (also known as normal form, static or simultaneous games) is 
a game model in which all players made their decisions simultaneously, without 
knowing the strategies of other players. By contrast, an extensive form game (also 
known as dynamic form or sequential games) model illustrates the situation where 
players made their decisions in a specific order of the game. The representations of 
these two types of games are different as well. The normal form games are often 
represented in payoff matrices, while the extensive form games are represented in 
decision trees to show the sequential decision moves of the players. In extensive 
form games, players take turns to make decisions at different node in the decision 
tree. 
2.4.3 Games with Perfect vs. Imperfect Information 
In the games with perfect information, the players are fully informed about each 
other’s strategies. However, only sequential games will be the games of perfect 
information, since the players of a simultaneous game do not know the strategies 
played by the other players. In the games with imperfect information, they may be 
imperfectly informed, or totally not informed at all about others’ choices. 
2.4.4 Taxonomy of Game Theory 
In general, game theory can be divided into two broad areas, named the non-
cooperative games (or competitive games) and the cooperative games (or coalitional 
games). Within the literature, a distinction can also be made between strategic form 
games (or static form games) and extensive form games (or dynamic form games), as 
well as by the type of informational structures, whether the games have complete or 
incomplete information and also perfect or imperfect information. 
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Figure 2.1 Taxonomy of game theoretic models (based on compilation by author 
from various source of references) 
Games with perfect information is often confused with games with complete 
information. Both are distinctive in concept and application. In games with complete 
information, the available strategies and payoffs of all players are commonly known. 
However, the players may not have any information on how other players will 
choose their strategy from the available choices. On the other hand, in games with 
perfect information, the other players may not know the available strategies and 
payoffs of other player, but every single move from each of the player will be 
perfectly observed by others. 
Generally, strategic form games consist of a set of n  players, where each player has 
their own set of strategies, Si . Each player’s payoffs are dependent on their 
respective choice of strategies, and also with respect to all the other n  players’ 
choice of strategies. Therefore, players would have to construct their best response 
function, considering all other possible configuration of strategies of other players. 
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There are two types of strategies played in strategic form games; they are the ‘pure 
strategies’ and ‘mixed strategies’. In games with pure strategy solution, players will 
always play a specific strategy that lies in the Nash equilibrium; while in games with 
mixed strategy solution, players will play their strategies randomly according to a 
specified probability. Nash Jr. (1951) proved that every non-cooperative game has at 
least one equilibrium point, in both pure and mixed strategies. The strategies that lie 
in any Nash equilibrium is the point where each player are better off regardless of 
what other players will choose for their strategies. Therefore, no rational players 
have the incentives to deviate from the strategies in Nash equilibrium of the game. 
Nash equilibrium remains the most widely used game theoretic concept in this day. 
Another type of equilibrium other than Nash equilibrium is the sub-game perfect 
equilibrium, which was developed by Selten (1965). Sub-game perfect equilibrium is 
the equilibrium that was determined by solving the game using the method of 
backward induction, in which the optimal strategies of players are determined from 
the end of the tree. Application of sub-game perfect equilibrium in strategic form 
games yields the concept of forward induction. Note that sub-game perfect 
equilibrium solves dynamic games and is always applied to pure strategies and not 
mixed strategies. When sub-game perfect equilibrium exists in mixed strategies, it is 
called the sequential equilibrium concept. 
In duopoly market structure, there exists two competing firms that produce 
homogeneous products and services in the market. Competition among firms can be 
separated into price competition and quantity competition. In general, there are three 
different models in the studies of game theory that are commonly used to analyse the 
competition of duopoly (2-player competition) and also oligopoly ( n -player 
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competition) market structures, namely the Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg 
models. Note that both Cournot and Bertrand models are categorized as strategic 
games, while Stackelberg model is under the category of dynamic games. 
Cournot (1838) anticipated the definition of equilibrium and applied it in the context 
of duopoly model. The concept of equilibrium has been formally proved and 
extended by Nash Jr. (1950). Cournot model is used to analyse the competition 
where firms are competing against each other in terms of quantity. In Cournot model, 
firms choose their quantities simultaneously; having each player’s decision will 
affect other players’ payoffs. 
Bertrand (1883) suggested a different model than Cournot model, in terms of 
strategies available, payoff functions, and behaviour of the players in the game. In 
Bertrand model, firms are actually competing in terms of prices simultaneously, 
rather than quantities as in Cournot model. 
Von Stackelberg (1934) proposed a dynamic Stackelberg model of market 
competition in which a dominant (leader) firm makes his first move followed by 
subordinates (followers). Firms are assumed to compete against each other by 
choosing their strategies in terms of quantities in Stackelberg model, as in the 
Cournot model, but sequentially. However, Stackelberg model can be further 
extended to analyse price competition model, as in the Bertrand model. 
In the book published by Luce and Raiffa (1957), the authors drew particular 
attention to the fact that the assumption of complete information is rather unrealistic 
in practice. Therefore, the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium was developed by 
Harsanyi (1967-68) in order to solve strategic games with incomplete information, 
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where each player’s payoffs are no longer a common knowledge to other players in 
the game, in which the payoffs function of a player is uncertain and not known by 
others. Strategic games with incomplete information are also known as static 
Bayesian games. The concept was extended by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and 
named Bayesian perfect equilibrium, which is applicable to dynamic games with 
imperfect information. 
Repeated games are essentially strategic form games that are played twice or more 
times instead of once. A finitely repeated game has the number of times the game 
being played to be a fixed with a finite number. The concept of Nash equilibrium and 
sub-game perfect equilibrium are applied to solve finitely repeated games.  
Infinitely repeated games are games where players played against each other over an 
infinite number of times. Since the infinitely repeated games has no end, methods of 
backward induction and obtaining a sub-game perfect equilibrium is impossible. 
Therefore, Nash Folk Theorem is necessary to solve the infinitely repeated game, 
where the game will stop if only any of the players deviates from the agreed 
sequence of actions. All the players will choose to stop the game as a punishment to 
the deviant of the game (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994). On the other hand, 
Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) developed the Perfect Folk Theorem to solve 
infinitely repeated games, where the threats of punishment must be credible. In the 
Perfect Folk Theorem, if the punisher does not punish the deviant, then the punisher 
is punished. 
Coalitional or cooperative games show that there exists possible actions for at least 
some or all players to cooperate among each other. Nash initiated an important 
research agenda named the ‘Nash Program’ in 1953. The initiation of the ‘Nash 
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Program’ is to bridge the gap between the two counterparts of game theory (non-
cooperative and cooperative games). ‘Nash Program’ claims that all coalitional 
games can be reduced to a non-cooperative formulation. Contrary to this notion is 
what may be termed the ‘Aumann Program’, which claimed that; at least two or 
more players may have a common interest in ganging up against the other players in 
the game when there exists more than two players in a game. 
In coalitional games, there are several types of equilibrium concept, depending on 
the structure of the games. Generally, they were divided into several models and 
alternate solution concepts for coalitional games: the core, the stable set, the Nash 
bargaining sets, Shapley value, and the nucleolus. In a simple objection coalitional 
game, an equilibrium is broken if any one of the players deviates from the 
equilibrium’s allocation. The coalitional game is divided into two types; they are the 
games with transferable utility and games with non-transferable utility. 
In coalitional games with transferable utility, the value function gives the total payoff 
to the coalition, which is to be allocated among the players within the coalition in a 
pre-defined way. However, the non-transferable utility coalitional games show 
nothing about the allocation of the total payoff of the coalition, where the players are 
not sure of their respective payoff when joining the coalition. A game with non-
transferable utility is a more general game comparing to a game with transferable 
utility. 
A cohesive coalition ensures that the payoff gained by any player in the coalition to 
be greater than the payoff that the player gains from involving in any other coalition 
(including sub-coalitions) or remain alone. The core is an equilibrium and solution 
concepts for coalitional games that require no set of players are able to break away 
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and take a joint action that makes all of them better off. The core is also a subset of 
the stable set, where the outcome of the core solution is said to be a stable solution if 
no coalition can deviate and obtain a better payoff for all its members (deviants). It is 
assumed that any deviation occurs in the game will end the game, ignoring the fact 
that any deviation by a player may trigger other players to react against it that will 
lead to a different final outcome. 
Contrary to the core, other solution concepts allow players in the coalitional game to 
deviate from the solution, where each possible deviation may lead to a stable 
outcome or be balanced by a counter-deviation. There are two approaches in this 
area. The first approach involved the solution concept of the stable sets. In this 
approach, any objection or deviation made by the players in the coalitional game will 
lead to an alternative outcome. This alternative outcome is constrained to be the 
stable set outcome, where no coalition will lead the players to achieve better payoffs, 
with alternative stable outcome. A coalitional game may have multiple stable sets. 
However, when the core itself represents a stable set, then there will be only one 
stable set, which is the core itself. 
However, the second approach illustrates the solution concepts of the Nash 
bargaining sets, the Kernel, and the Nucleolus, which show that any deviation (or 
objection) in a game will be cut short after two stages (Maschler, 1992). The game 
will regain its stability with a balancing counter-objection. The counter-objection is 
unlike the situation in the stable set, in which the objection moves to the point where 
the player deviates. Rather, the counter-objection in this approach suggests a 
different point, which allows players to perform better than the point where the 
deviant deviates. Different notions of objection and counter-objection give rise to a 
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number of different solution concepts. Before proceeding to the next section, we first 
define Player 1 as the player who objects, while Player 2 as the player who counter-
objects in order to obtain a better description of the solution concepts. 
Both the objection and counter-objection in the case of the bargaining set is between 
Player 1 and Player 2, in which when Player 1 is dissatisfied with the current 
coalitional allocation against Player 2, Player 1 will form his own coalition that 
exclude Player 2. Meanwhile, Player 2 will counter-object by forming another 
coalition of his own (by excluding Player 1). Since each objection and counter-
objection must exclude the player who are to be objected to, then the core is defined 
as the set of allocation where no objections or counter-objections by the other 
players. 
The Kernel case is defined when the objection and counter-objection is between 
Player 1 and a coalition formed by Player 2 that excludes Player 1. Note that when 
Player 2 forms a counter-objection coalition against Player 1, the total payoff gained 
by the coalition members when Player 1 objects is less than the total payoff gained 
when Player 2 counter-objects by forming coalition against Player 1. The difference 
between the bargaining set and the Kernel is that the objection and counter-objection 
in the Kernel case requires the consideration of the total payoffs of all the members 
in the coalition and the total gain (or loss) of a coalition’s move. 
The objection and counter-objection in the Nucleolus case is between coalition and 
coalition (Schmeidler, 1969). An objection by a coalition formed is assumed to yield 
better payoff than the original ones, while the counter-objection coalition formed 
against the objection coalition suffers a loss. This case is rather different from the 
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previous two cases (the bargaining set and the Kernel); it is essential to minimize the 
loss of the counter-objection’s coalition formed in the Nucleolus case. 
 
 
